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Abstract 
Water scarcity and water stress issues have become clear threat to the global population. This makes water 
management a critical aspect to ensure sustainable water. An efficient water management system requires thousands 
of constraint devices (sensors and/or actuators) to be deployed across the water distribution network to enable near-
real time monitoring and control of the water grid components. Security at both the device and network level is 
critical to the operation of such a system. Although several IT security controls have developed over the past few 
decades, they cannot be used directly with such constraint devices. This is due to their limited resources and unique 
requirements. However, some of these techniques can be adapted and used with these constraint devices. In this 
paper, we propose security architecture for smart water management systems, the architecture leverages existing 
security solutions and design patterns 
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1. Introduction 
We live in a technological world where Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has 
become crucial for sustainable development. Water management1 is one of the areas where ICT plays a 
key role in addressing various associated challenges such leakage detection and dynamic optimization2. 
While addition of ICT to critical infrastructures enhances performance, it also leaves the infrastructure 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
Building an efficient smart water management system requires deployment of thousands of sensors 
and/or actuators to monitor and control water grid components such as water meter, pumps, and pressure 
sensors3,4,5. These devices are likely to be controlled over a wireless network, and if a hacker gains access 
to the network they can breach confidentiality and integrity. While there is a lot of research that has gone 
into addressing security over the past decade, many of the existing solutions are not suitable for water 
management systems due to unique requirements and constraints such as limited computing resources and 
over-the-air communications6. 
We address this problem from the design perspective; while some of the existing solutions can be re-
used, design of the security architecture has to evolve to address the new requirements. In this paper, we 
adapt and combine some of the existing security techniques to propose a simple security architecture. We 
discuss threads and new design patterns in Section 2. In Section 3 we propose our solution and the paper 
concludes in Section 4. 
2. Security Threads and Design Patterns 
When it comes to intelligent water management system threats, we deal with more than just hacking 
into the network. One of the biggest concerns is physical attacks that can be launched on a device. Most 
field devices are portable, making capturing easy. After capturing the device the attacker can clone the 
device, install new firmware or learn sensitive information stored in the device7. Unlike conventional 
networks that are physically protected, devices in the field are accessible to anyone. And it is easy to 
pinpoint their location by tracking signals8. 
For efficient functioning of the infrastructure, in addition to physical attacks, we have to protect 
against attacks that do not require the hacker to be part of the network. This class of attacks includes radio 
jamming to prevent communication between legitimate devices and eavesdropping using sniffing tools5,9. 
Attacks that hinder communication between devices, affect the real-time dynamic intelligent part of the 
system such as the supervisory control. These real-time components are also affected when the 
sensor/meter data is tempered with, resulting in erroneous optimization4,10. 
Finally, updating the firmware in devices that are already deployed should also be secure. Because 
updates can only be transferred over the air, attackers can use this to their advantage and install rogue 
updates8. What’s even more difficult for a new device is to establish the root of trust; which other devices 
to trust? Furthermore, the new device has to prove to other devices that it is legitimate and trustworthy. If 
this step is not secure, any security steps that follow would not be useful. 
The unique threats call for a shift in the way we design security architectures. We consider new design 
patterns: 
 
x Publish / subscribe communication model. One device may play many roles; it can be a producer 
collecting and publishing water reading and/or a consumer processing data published by a producer. 
Establishing and maintaining connections with each and every other peer device would be heavy for a 
constrained device. A publish/subscribe model introduces a broker, which is a capable server that 
would be responsible for pushing published data to consumers. This model also eliminates the need for 
edge devices to have vulnerable open inbound ports11. Standardized, simple and lightweight 
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communication protocols like Constrained Application protocol (COAP) and MQ Telemetry Transport 
(MQTT) already support publish / subscribe model and they have been proved to be robust12. 
x Offload security from edge devices (sensors/actuators) to trusted gateways. Because of constrained 
resources, existing security solutions are too heavy for edge devices. These solutions need to be 
adapted to offload heavy operations to trusted gateways. The gateways should be responsible for 
creating, updating and distribution of certificates and access secrets13. This allows edge devices to 
focus on reporting about their surroundings and/or control water grid components. 
x Stateless Authentication. The less we do at the edge, the longer the life span of the devices. Traditional 
server-based authentication methods would not scale in smart water systems. For that reason, many 
authors have proposed token-based authentication11,12,13. The merits include stateless in nature and the 
ability to work across domains. Since the token itself is enough to authenticate a device, this method 
eliminates the need to store session data. 
x Block-chain technology. Bitcoin is a digital currency that relies on block-chain technology, which is a 
ledger of all legitimate transactions that have occurred on a network14,15. The ledger is maintained by 
all users in the network. It can be used for a range of other non-monetary transactions, including 
creation and exchange tokens and to track/verify other kinds of digital exchanges16. For example, 
Name-coin block-chain records who owns which name in a namespace, and hence to track the history 
of devices in network, providing a trustless and decentralized network.  
 
These design approaches can assist mitigate a lot of existing threats. In the following section, we 
propose a simple security architecture that incorporates these design patterns.  
3. The Security Architecture 
In this section we propose a simple security architecture, shown in Fig 1., which leverages the design 
concepts discussed in section 2. We assume that publish-subscribe messaging pattern is used and that 
publishers and consumers only interact with an MQTT broker like Mosquiitto, and not directly with each 
other. We introduce Authorization and Access Control Servers (AAC) into our architecture as shown in 
Fig 1. The role of the AAC is to authenticate devices and provide them with access tokens. These access 
tokens can be used later for stateless authentication. For simplification purposes, the broker/gateway and 
AAC are shown as separate components.  
Publishers that wish to join the network firstly need to connect to an AAC server pre-configured before 
deployment. Using block-chain technology the device creates a unique ID and stores it in its crypto-chip. 
The device sends its identity to the AAC server. The AAC verifies the identity and authenticates the new 
device. If authentication is successful, the AAC server creates a new access token with the ID of the 
device and expiry date. The token is signed and transmitted to the device. After authenticating itself with 
the AAC server, the device can publish or read updates depending on the type of access granted.  
To allow the broker to authenticate an update, the publisher must append the write access token with 
every update request. Likewise, when a consumer wishes to receive updates, the consumer must first 
obtain a read access token from the AAC server. The access token will be used to subscribe to updates 
through the broker. The AAC server is the only fully trusted entity in the network. It manages both 
publishers and consumers, validates their identities, issues access tokens, handles caching and other 
security operations. By moving these responsibilities to the AAC server, the edge-devices can save energy 
by focusing on lightweight tasks like forwarding observations.  
Notice that there is no direct interaction between publishers and consumers. By decoupling publishers 
and consumers, we allow flexibility and thus scalability. A publisher could be serving hundreds of 
consumers, it need not worry about them and whether data was received and if they have privileges to 
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receive that data. It also allows for smooth replacement of publishers should existing publishers die or be 
compromised.  
We consider three security goals: secure booting, secure communication and secure firmware updates. 
By addressing all these goals we can improve end-to-end security. 
3.1. Secure Booting 
The first step towards device security is ensuring secure booting. Secure booting prevents installation 
of malicious code onto the device. By making sure that the booting process is secured, we can establish 
securely the root of trust for the device. Public key cryptography is utilized at this stage. During 
manufacturing, the public key to be used for verification is pre-loaded into the non-writable storage on the 
device. At power-on the device uses the pre-loaded key to verify the code, to ensure it has been 
authorized, before running it. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Security Architecture 
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3.2. Secure Communication 
While public key cryptography can be used in the first step (secure booting), it would be too heavy to 
use during normal operation. For that reason, we move away from using public key cryptography to 
secure communications. Instead, we rely on cryptographic hash functions and stateless access tokens. 
Before the producer publishes content, a cryptographic hash function is used to produce a hash value. 
This hash value is sent along with the original content and access token. When the consumer receives 
content, it uses the hash value and the access token to validate the identity, integrity and authenticity of 
the publisher / content. 
3.3. Secure Firmware Updates 
The other important security issue is to securely firmware update on already deployed devices. To 
secure firmware updates, we use public key cryptography and hash functions. When a device downloads 
updates from the network, it validates those updates by 1) calculating the hash value and comparing it 2) 
Check the signature to ensure the identity of the server. These steps verify both integrity and authenticity. 
There are two ways in which the device can learn about the public key of the update server. The first 
option would be to pre-load the key during manufacturing, this option is limited, but would be enough for 
some environments. The second option would be for the AAC to give this information to the new device 
during initial authentication together with access tokens.  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed simple security architecture for smart water management systems to ensure 
secure booting, secure communications and secure firmware updates. It is based on new design patterns 
such as publish-subscribe and stateless authentication. By coupling cryptographic hash functions and 
stateless access tokens, we can efficiently validate the identity of the device and the integrity/ authenticity 
of the content. Trusted entities were introduced to handle heavy security tasks such as validation and 
authentication of devices, issuing of access tokens and so on. We also introduced brokers to manage 
publishers and consumers, further moving heavy operations away from edge devices. The proposed 
system will be implemented and tested using WSN testbed17,18. Extra security features and techniques will 
be added and implemented in the final smart water management system2.  
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